Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: A Critical Guide (Cambridge Critical Guides)
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Published in 1953, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations had a deeply unsettling effect upon our most basic philosophical ideas concerning thought, sensation and language. Its claim that philosophical questions of meaning necessitate a close analysis of the way we use language continues to influence Anglo-American philosophy today. However, its compressed and dialogic prose is not always easy to follow. This collection of essays deepens but also challenges our understanding of the work's major themes, such as the connection between meaning and use, the nature of concepts, thought and intentionality, and language games. Bringing together leading philosophers and Wittgenstein scholars, it offers a genuinely critical approach and demonstrating Wittgenstein's relevance for contemporary philosophy. This volume will appeal to readers interested in the later Wittgenstein, in addition to those interested in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, metaphysics and epistemology.
the language-games (b) and (c) respectively? But this was the question that prompted Wittgenstein’s discussion of family resemblance in the first place. So it looks as though we might accept the main conclusions of that discussion while also holding on to the Tractarian ideas that they were supposed to dislodge. Of course this is not to say that the Tractatus has given a correct account of how even some limited sector of language achieves what it seems to. Indeed there are still many serious
to insist that they are no more literally true than ‘The sun sets’? The answer to both questions is no. In response to the foregoing argument about projection he has the interlocutor say: ‘Well yes, but then mayn’t an application come before my mind ? – It may [Wittgenstein replies]: only we need to get clearer about our application of this expression.’ Later in the same section he continues: Can there be a collision between picture and application? There can, inasmuch as the picture makes us
checking later what you meant by it all along, and the private linguist cannot do this; (iii) sortalism – if you name a type ‘S’ then you have to specify what type of thing you are naming ‘S’, and the private linguist cannot do this. Let us now consider these three interpretations in turn. (i) Verificationism. According to this interpretation of PI 258 the answers to our questions (a)–(e) may be stated as follows. (a) To ‘remember the connection right’ is to write ‘S’ in one’s diary for just
basis of what they do observe: in practice this is my behaviour. And what is this ‘I’ that observes these sensational states? It is not my body or any mere state of my body. It is a spiritual entity called the ‘self’ that directly observes just the sensations that it ‘owns’. There are many such selves, each one corresponding to a person, and each one has ‘its’ sensations that it observes directly and which no other self observes directly. But the self can understand what it is for another self to
31–42. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in his Frege and Other Philosophers (1991): 237–48. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Evans, G. 1980. ‘Things without the mind’. In Z. van Straaten, ed., Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented to P. F. Strawson: 76–116. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Reprinted in his Collected Papers (1985): 249–90. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Feyerabend, P. 1955. ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations’. Philosophical Review 64: 449–83. Reprinted in G. Pitcher, ed.,