Varieties of Skepticism (Berlin Studies in Knowledge Research)
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This volume brings out the varieties of forms of philosophical skepticism that have continued to preoccupy philosophers for the past couple of centuries, as well as the specific varieties of philosophical response that these have engendered - above all, in the work of those who have sought to take their cue from Kant, Wittgenstein, or Cavell - and to illuminate how these philosophical approaches are related to and bear upon one another.
teaching about skepticism to heart. Perhaps this kind of disagreement is most explicitly thematized in Part Three, where the central issue in several of the essays is just that of what fidelity to Cavell’s response to skepticism requires of its philosophical audience. These points of contention among our authors are related to another point on which they have differing views—namely, the question of what would constitute a satisfying response to skepticism. To what extent is the philosophical task
demand more. Agrippa’s trilemma calls attention to the need for beliefs that meet two conditions. First, they must be non-inferentially credible: justified without deriving their justification inferentially from further beliefs. Second, given that justification cannot be seen as a purely dialectical exercise, they must be credible in a way that reflects some kind of external constraint. Empirical knowledge cannot just be a matter of bandying words about: it must have something to do with the
Wellmer is of the view that it must be possible to develop a form of interpretivism that is free of skeptical consequences, Stone is concerned to show, on the contrary, that merely conceding the opening assumption of interpretivism is already sufficient to give the skeptic what he most desires. Interpretivism, according to Stone, is based on the thought that rules are, in a fundamental sense, unable to determine the particular case that falls under them. Stone argues that interpretivism is based
provided in the 6.3s of what the use is of the laws of physics, puts pressure on the skeptic to examine his own intentions. Is there a use he wants to give to his words? The point is not that he is saying something, or trying to say something, where the ‘something’ he says or tries to say runs foul of a principle. (I am suggesting, then, that we can see what Wittgenstein’s own method is only if we do not assume that there is no real problem what he is doing with talk of the limits of language. I
so very different should have conspired to produce a common effect. According to Quine, classical epistemology has been largely concerned with the justification of knowledge against skepticism. But that project has failed. See Quine 1969, 72: “The Humean predicament is the human predicament.” So classical epistemology should give way to a naturalized successor-discipline without justificatory pretensions. According to Rorty 1979, 140: “The Cartesian mind simultaneously made possible veil-of-ideas