The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (Elgar Original Reference)
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This authoritative and comprehensive reference work introduces the reader to the major concepts and leading contributors in the field of law and economics.
The companion features accessible, informative and provocative entries on all the significant areas and breaks new ground by bringing together widely dispersed but theoretically congruent ideas for the first time. An important feature of the book is the inclusion of 26 scholarly biographies of the founding fathers of law and economics.
As a major source of reference on law and economics, the companion will be welcomed by both students and teachers in law and economics, and will also have relevance for industrial economists and historians of economic thought.
Contributors: J.G. Backhaus, D. Bellante, M. Brinig, C.F. Buechtemann, G. Chaloupek, A. Daastol, W. Drechsler, J.N. Drobak, J.L.M. Elders, G. Frezza, H. Grossekettler, J.-M. Josselin, P. Lewisch, A. Marciano, S.G. Medema, N. Mercuro, T.J. Miceli, C. Muller, D.C. North, F. Parisi, H. Pearson, H. Peukert, M. Prisching, W.J. Samuels, A.A. Schmid, P.R. Senn, Z. Sevic, E. Streissler, M. Tietzel, L. Van den Hauwe, R.E. Wagner, U. Walwei
of the resource’s free attributes is the strategy used to reduce common-property problems. Privatization means that, in order to achieve allocative efficiency, the residual claim to common property should be assigned to that part of the externality relation that mainly affects the outcome. The strategy of privatization may be interpreted as ‘Coasean’ in that it is not only the harmed person to whom the right to the commonly used attributes may be granted. The harming person may also become the
individual entitlements or rights, as a necessary prerequisite for operationalizing wealth maximization. The second springs from the theoretical difficulty of defining the proper role of efficiency as an ingredient of justice, vis-à-vis other social goals. In his well-known defence of wealth maximization as a guide for judicial action, Posner (1985) distinguishes wealth or expected utility from market prices. While market prices may not always fully reflect idiosyncratic valuations, they avoid an
incentives to take the optimal level of precautions (care and activity level) as under no liability. If the avoider is the injurer, he/she will have to pay only when he/she does not take at least the due level of care. If the injurer is negligent, he/she has to bear the cost of care and the expected accident cost (pay damages to the victim). On the contrary, if the injurer takes due care, he/she avoids liability and bears only the cost of care. If due care is set at the efficient level, the
pluralism’, Boston University Law Review, 67, 105– 75. Cohen, Lloyd (1987), ‘Marriage, divorce and quasi-rents, or, “I gave him the best years of my life”’, Journal of Legal Studies, 16, 269–303. Cooter, Robert and Barry Freedman (1991), ‘The fiduciary relationship: its economic character and legal consequences’, New York University Law Review, 66, 1045–75. Cox, Donald and Oded Stark (1993), ‘The demonstration effect’, Working Paper, Boston College, Department of Economics. Dowd, Nancy (1994), ‘A
Elgar companion to law and economics sections, the standard literature relies essentially on the thesis of an incentive to create and/or disclose new ideas. However, although this argument doubtless remains valid in the general case, it fails to satisfactorily take into account various consequences arising from the new legal institutions and the specific technological context. One important such consequence is the dynamic effect of intellectual property rights on the market structure of the