Real Metaphysics: Essays in honour of D. H. Mellor
Hallvard Lillehammer, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra
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Real Metaphysics brings together new articles by leading metaphysicians to honour Hugh Mellor's outstanding contribution to metaphysics. Some of the most outstanding minds of current times shed new light on all the main topics in metaphysics: truth, causation, dispositions and properties, explanation, and time. At the end of the book, Hugh Mellor responds to the issues raised by each of the thirteen contributors and gives us new insight into his own highly influential work on metaphysics.
Part of the Routledge Studies in Twentieth Century Philosophy series.
This ISBN is for the hardcover version of the text. Other ISBNs for this title:
0203164296 (master eBook ISBN)
0203258452 (Adobe eReader format)
restriction, which he attributes to Frank Jackson. Although not directly relevant to the question of truthmakers for mere possibilities, this limitation is of sufficient interest to merit a brief digression. Jackson’s idea was to restrict the propositions p and q in the formula to contingent truths. To this Restall objected that if for q we substitute the conjunction of contingent p with any necessary truth N, then that conjunction is still a contingent truth because one conjunct is contingent.
of entities is replaced by an innocent multiplicity of counterpart relations. (Compare Yablo 1987, in which the acceptance of a multitude of qua-versions of things – not his term – really is a multiplication of entities.) Once we have decided that Lumpl is Goliath, there is no need to try to understand the strangely intimate relation of ‘constitution’ that supposedly unites these two different things. Likewise for me and my body. Likewise for Long qua black and Long simpliciter. 5 Toil or
‘there’s a client’ is true. Suppose Sam believes that what she said is a sign that she believes that there is a client. Sam then infers that she believes that there is a client. Lastly, suppose Sam believes that her believing that there is a client is a sign that there is a client. Sam then infers that there is a client. What distinguishes communication from the doorbell case is that X gets the belief that p from what Y believes (namely, from Y’s belief that p). But X does not infer that p
causability are not possible. Since, simultaneous causation is possible only if two facts are spatio-temporally coincident, simultaneous causation is not possible. Let me express a preliminary worry about this argument before we get to the heart of the matter. The argument partly rests on (III), and (III) is not an obvious consequence of Mellor’s identity criterion for facts. Indeed, Mellor’s identity criterion for facts seems in tension with (I) and (II) taken together. Mellor suggests that,
(1985). To repeat, I do not intend to legislate linguistic usage. There are other construals of suppositional reasoning and the associated conditionals on offer. In particular, there is the view that provides closest worlds semantics for conditionals along the lines of Stalnaker (1968) or more impressively of Lewis (1973). Closest worlds approaches are incompatible with Ramsey’s approach to open conditionals that I have followed here unless distance between worlds is gerrymandered in a fashion