Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton Studies in International History and Politics)
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Nuclear Logics examines why some states seek nuclear weapons while others renounce them. Looking closely at nine cases in East Asia and the Middle East, Etel Solingen finds two distinct regional patterns. In East Asia, the norm since the late 1960s has been to forswear nuclear weapons, and North Korea, which makes no secret of its nuclear ambitions, is the anomaly. In the Middle East the opposite is the case, with Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Libya suspected of pursuing nuclear-weapons capabilities, with Egypt as the anomaly in recent decades.
Identifying the domestic conditions underlying these divergent paths, Solingen argues that there are clear differences between states whose leaders advocate integration in the global economy and those that reject it. Among the former are countries like South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, whose leaders have had stronger incentives to avoid the political, economic, and other costs of acquiring nuclear weapons. The latter, as in most cases in the Middle East, have had stronger incentives to exploit nuclear weapons as tools in nationalist platforms geared to helping their leaders survive in power. Solingen complements her bold argument with other logics explaining nuclear behavior, including security dilemmas, international norms and institutions, and the role of democracy and authoritarianism. Her account charts the most important frontier in understanding nuclear proliferation: grasping the relationship between internal and external political survival. Nuclear Logics is a pioneering book that is certain to provide an invaluable resource for researchers, teachers, and practitioners while reframing the policy debate surrounding nonproliferation.
institutions. Sixth, asserting that the NPR accounts for progressive denuclearization is inherently difﬁcult, because its effects must be weighed relative to hypothetical histories (counterfactuals) without the NPT.14 This alternative path of history is hard to know. Would more states have opted for nuclear weapons had the NPT never been concluded? Not necessarily, particularly if neorealist, constructivist, or domestic politics arguments could explain many cases that did not covet nuclear
Southeast Asian states were autocracies when they denuclearized, and they largely abided by their NPT commitments. Third, most autocracies avoided nuclearization in both regions. Fourth, although most nuclear aspirants in the Middle East were autocracies (Iraq, Libya, Nasser’s Egypt, Iran), some reversed course and abandoned nuclear weapons programs (Egypt, Libya). Autocracies have thus not exhibited uniform nuclear behavior in this region. Fifth, the only continuous Middle East democracy—Israel
Chapter Six argue, “The ultimate goal of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is to keep a Kim in power, not to assure the security of the North Korean state” [emphasis added]. International Institutions: Rejecting the NPT and Crawling toward the Six-Party Talks North Korea’s refusal to sign the NPT for many years may seem compatible with neoliberal institutional perspectives regarding the conditions under which states are likely to join institutions, insofar as the NPT granted nuclear status
game. He had been connected with rabid factions that executed two American soldiers in the DMZ in 1976, planted the 1983 bomb in Rangoon and the 1987 bomb on KAL, and forced North Korea’s NPT withdrawal in 1993 (Wampler 2003, Document 3; Oberdorfer 2001). Kim Jong-Il introduced the policy of son’gun cho˘ngch’i (“military ﬁrst”) to replace juche and its promoters with a policy North Korea • 133 of kangso˘ngdaeguk (Strong and Prosperous Great Power) to reassure the military. As enunciated by
hosted a warm dinner reception for Park Keun-hye, late Park Chung-Hee’s daughter, quite a shift from the days when Park’s strategy was vituperated as a failed policy of corrupt sadaejuui. In July 2002 Kim launched the most comprehensive reforms ever, steered by Premier Hong Song-nam, including the ﬁrst foreign onshore oil concession, monetization, price controls relaxation, devaluation (to attract foreign investment and promote exports), decentralization of decisions in agriculture and industry,