Negotiation: Theory and Strategy (2nd Edition)

Negotiation: Theory and Strategy (2nd Edition)

Russell Korobkin

Language: English

Pages: 495


Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub

Negotiation: Theory and Strategy combines narrative text, materials from the social sciences, and cutting-edge legal scholarship. Organized into a logical analytic framework, Korobkin's conceptual approach provides students with an effective structure for understanding the negotiation process and improving their skills. This concise casebook, along with simulations included in the teacher's manual, teaches students how to analyze and apply strategic concepts through analysis and problem solving.

Negotiation: Theory and Strategy, Second Edition, features:
* introductions to theoretical perspectives that provide different avenues for approaching negotiation: * economics and game theory
* cognitive and social psychology
* legal and business analysis

* excerpts from leading negotiation scholars that reflect a variety of fields, such as law, business, psychology, and economics
* complete teaching materials that will support a two-, three-, or four-unit negotiation course and include: * narrative text and excerpted materials
* questions and problems for in-class discussion
* negotiation simulation exercises (in the Teacher's Manual*)

* a modular chapter design that adapts to a variety of teaching objectives
* clear and engaging writing
* generous use of hypotheticals and examples

Updated throughout, the Second Edition offers:
* expanded discussion of the role of emotions and aspirations
* additional coverage of multiparty negotiation, gender, trust, and the use of mediation
* additional negotiation simulations to encourage students to practice on core topics

With its flexible organization that is easily adapted to a variety of teaching objectives, Negotiation: Theory and Strategy, Second Edition, promises a stimulating class experience along with generous teaching support.

Hell Is a Very Small Place: Voices from Solitary Confinement

Basic Legal Writing

Learning Evidence: From the Federal Rules to the Courtroom (American Casebooks)

Legal Terminology for Transcription and Court Reporting

Getting To Maybe: How to Excel on Law School Exams

Higher Education Law: The Faculty




















future of the local business climate, but he would still want to learn what Jacob's predictions were about the business climate because Jacob's predictions will affect Jacob's reservation price. Esau might find Jacob's predictions unrealistically optimistic, but the information will still be useful because it will suggest that Jacob will not be willing to sell for anything less than a high price. Esau might also seek to discover whether Esau has a reason he needs to sell the business quickly, as

integrative solution is one in which the parties jointly enjoy more than 100% of the value that one would enjoy from receiving the entire burger. Perhaps Barney prefers the more well-done portion of the burger around the edges, while Fred prefers the more rare portion of the burger near the center. By giving the middle of the burger to Fred and the edges to Barney, the parties find themselves at point "d." Neither one receives as much value as he would have had he received the entire burger, but

expend the resources necessary to bring his idea to market, but for personal reasons (i.e., wanting to leave his mark in the world) as well as financial reasons, Sam would prefer to continue to work on developing the commercial applications of the enzyme himself. He believes that with appropriate staffing and funding, the product might be ready to be marketed in five years. Sam has contacted a number of individuals and firms who invest in biotechnology start-up companies in search of an investor.

deal. In the following seminal work, Thomas Schelling explores how negotiators can make commitments to courses of action not in their best interests in order to force concessions from their opponents. C. Commitments 165 • Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict* 21-37 (1960) ... Our concern will not be with the part of bargaining that consists of exploring for mutually profitable adjustments, and that might be called the "efficiency" aspect of bargaining .... Instead, we shall be

Clyde insisting on $80,000, the first party to tire of the stand-off will concede to the other's demand. Because both parties know the more impatient one will concede first, the negotiator who is able to convince the other that he or she would be more patient in such a stand-off can exercise bargaining power before such a stand-off occurs. If Bonnie knows she is less patient than Clyde, she can reason that she would lose any extended stand-off, so she might as well concede most of the cooperative

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