Heidegger, Metaphysics and the Univocity of Being (Bloomsbury Studies in Continental Philosophy)
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In Heidegger, Metaphysics and the Univocity of Being, Philip Tonner presents an interpretation of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger in terms of the doctrine of the ‘univocity of being'. According to the doctrine of univocity there is a fundamental concept of being that is truly predicable of everything that exists. This book explores Heidegger's engagement with the work of John Duns Scotus, who raised philosophical univocity to its historical apotheosis. Early in his career, Heidegger wrote a book-length study of what he took to be a philosophical text of Duns Scotus'. Yet, the word ‘univocity' rarely features in translations of Heidegger's works. Tonner shows, by way of a comprehensive discussion of Heidegger's philosophy, that a univocal notion of being in fact plays a distinctive and crucial role in his thought. This book thus presents a novel interpretation of Heidegger's work as a whole that builds on a suggested interpretation by Gilles Deleuze in Difference and Repetition and casts a new light on Heidegger's philosophy, clearly illuminating his debt to Duns Scotus.
appropriation, but as meaningful presence, it is still univocal. Appendix The Univocity of Being: Deleuze Since the publication of Alain Badiou’s Deleuze: La clameur de l’Etre in 1997 the doctrine of the univocity of being has become a central point of interpretation in Deleuze scholarship. For his part, Badiou interprets Deleuze as a classical thinker of the One where the ‘nominal pair virtual/actual exhausts the deployment of univocal being’.1 Leaving the issue of how close Badiou’s reading
cause is the metaphysical ground for the predication of divine names by analogy. In his Categories Aristotle had argued that predicates are either substantial (essential) or accidental. Substantial predicates treat of the kind of thing that the subject is. Accidental predicates, by contrast, treat of the non-essential attributes of the subject. By the time he wrote the Metaphysics, he had realized that this classification was limited. In the Metaphysics, being and unity emerge as features of
partly the Kantian transcendental project of answering the question of how knowledge is possible in the first place. In order to engage in phenomenological research it is necessary, from Husserl’s point of view, to ‘bracket’ or suspend all claims about empirical reality outside consciousness. This epoché of beings to the appearance of beings in consciousness provides for phenomenological description. Phenomenology was, for Husserl, the study of what appears in consciousness. He held that only by
thought, which was inaugurated in the thought of Plato and Aristotle, has had the effect of instigating the forgetting of the more originary and primordial Greek experience of a-letheia. A-letheia is that happening whereby the world as an elaborate historical context of significance becomes opened-up or uncovered for Dasein. Aletheia is the very emergence into the open, it is that process whereby beings are brought into the clearing and become un-concealed. Within the course of the unfolding of
primordial presencing process (Anwesen) becomes degraded by a process of calcification and becomes the permanent presence of the Idea (Plato) or substance (Aristotle). The process of calcification does not stop there: it continues with the medieval scholastic conception of substantia. A little further on in ‘The Anaximander Fragment’ Heidegger lets us see just how he thinks this happens: what is present insists on remaining present in the sense of perduring and becoming permanent. We should note